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April 15, 2007 - April 21, 2007

April 20, 2007

Why So Much Bad Advice?

In the April issue of SmartMoney, Dyan Machan conducted a little test. Posing as a prospective client who needed various kinds of financial advice, she visited eight brokerage firms in Manhattan and northern New Jersey. Machan suggests that in giving financial advice per se, the brokers she visited may have violated SEC rules. That may be true, but it's not our concern here. Our concern is with the poor quality of many of the reommendations she received. Here's a typical lowlight:

Our twin sons are less than two years away from attending college. That means they aren't great candidates for a 529 college-savings plan, because they don't have much time to take advantage of the plan's tax-free earnings. But brokerages can collect hefty commissions by enrolling clients in such plans. So--surprise--they often advised us to join up. They also steered us to state-sponsored plans with which they had special fee arrangements, even when another state's plan was the better deal for us.

For what it's worth, we think brokerage firms' too-cozy arrangements with specific 529 plans is one of the worst constraints their brokers face. Here's another jaw-dropper:

Are you a fiduciary? It's an important question. A fiduciary has to put his client's financial interests above his own and his firm's. But every broker but one either botched the answer or gave us a blank look. The exception: A broker at Dreyfus, when asked whether he would be our fiduciary, answered: "No, but I play one on TV."

What about asset allocation? Fees and expenses? Here's Machan:

The advice we'd received had ranged all over the map. Smith Barney thought we should have 95% of our assets in equity-only mutual funds. Merrill Lynch advocated 56%. The annual fees ranged from 0.5% of our assets at Charles Schwab up to 2.25% at Morgan Stanley--and that doesn't include the sales loads on some of the products they recommended.

This is not a pretty picture. Now, we want to be clear: even if Dyan Machan didn't find any, there are plenty of conscientious, professional, sophisticated brokers out there. We happen to know quite a few fine brokers ourselves. But let's also be honest about this: There are far too many hacks in the business, and one might reasonably wonder why. We'd point to four reasons, and we're sure there are more. 

  1. Brokerage firms are more interested in teaching new brokers to sell than they are in teaching them to manage money responsibly. The result? New brokers who want to learn about the disciplines of money and risk management, in any sense beyond the most superficial conventional wisdom, have to do so on their own. Trust us: That can be a lonely feeling.
  2. The industry has remarkably low barriers to entry. The brokerage business puts few obstacles in the way of someone who wants in. Exams like the Series 7 or the Series 65? They're important, and they require some preparation because the volume of material is relatively large, but they aren't especially demanding from a technical perspective.
  3. Inertia. Brokers aren't alone in this, but they tend to get locked into certain ways of doing business, practices that tend to become dated and often inferior to newer, smarter ways of managing money. For practical and financial reasons, it can be difficult to break out of established modes (say, for example, selling actively managed mutual funds in spite of abundant evidence that such funds are rotten deals for most investors).
  4. Perverse incentives. This is the mother of all problems. Here's a good example. In a fee-based brokerage platform with which we're familiar, client fees--and thus broker revenues--vary by asset allocation. The more stocks and stock funds in the account, the higher the fee. The more bonds and bond funds, the lower the fee. From every perspective, including the broker's, this is an awful incentive system. And that's in a fee-based platform, which is often touted as aligning everyone's interests. In addition, as Machan found, there are far too many many product-driven incentives to sell mutual funds, insurance, specific (often inferior) 529 plans, and so on.

Again, the point here is not to indict the entire brokerage industry and every broker working in it. In some sense, these facts of life in the industry make the good brokers all the more impressive, because they have to swim upstream every day, fighting the currents we've just described.

So how can you distinguish good advice from bad? We'll answer that question in future posts.

Source

Dyan Machan, "Many Brokers Offer Financial Advice They Shouldn't Give," SmartMoney, March 13, 2007

April 19, 2007

More on the Fiduciary Difference

Twice last week we posted on the fiduciary duties of Registered Investment Advisors like Interlake. (Those items are available here and here.)

By law, we're required to put our clients' interests above all others. And as a fee-only firm, we have no incentive to push any product. That's the right way to do business. But it's not the only way business is done in this industry.

Tuesday at Marketwatch, Chuck Jaffe offered his perspective on the recent Circuit Court victory for the RIA community. Here's how Jaffe finishes his column:

While the rules of the investment-advice game are changing, consumers must continue to start the financial-planning process with the same old questions about how advisers get paid, what they provide for those dollars and whose interests come first, because unless you have a scorecard and a rulebook, it's tough to tell who you might want to have playing on your financial team.

Compensation systems and fiduciary standards are hugely important. But whether they work with an RIA or a broker, investors should also worry about the quality of the guidance they receive. Unfortunately, there's a lot of mediocre advice out there. We'll explore that problem--and what might explain it--in our next post.

Source

Chuck Jaffe, "New rules alter financial-planning game for consumers," Marketwatch, April 17, 2007

April 18, 2007

Certified ETF Ridiculousness

On April 8th, we posted on the "excesses of the ETF gold rush." So we had to chuckle approvingly at this item from David Gaffen at the WSJ's Marketbeat blog:

We're getting into full "jump the shark" territory with exchange-traded funds, particularly on names of said funds. XShares Advisors LLC, which has more than 20 ETFs, launched the HealthShares Dermatology and Wound Care ETF, which began trading today on the Big Board. Dermatology and wound care. Seriously.

For a tidy definition of "jumping the shark," see this entry at Wikipedia, which includes, as a bonus, a great shot of a leather-jacketed Henry Winkler on water skis.

Wednesday Morning Reading

Here are a few items that caught our interest this morning...

April 17, 2007

Self-Reliance in Retirement

Last week at Marketwatch, Robert Powell wrote that when it comes to financial security in retirement, Americans might rightly be labeled "a delusional lot." His evidence?

More than seven in 10 Americans are either "very confident" or "somewhat confident" they will have enough money to live comfortably throughout their retirement years.

Yet almost half of workers have less than $25,000 -- excluding their primary residence or any defined-benefit pension plans -- salted away for the so-called golden years, according to the 2007 Retirement Confidence Survey released this week by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI).

Yikes. The point here isn't just that most Americans aren't prepared to enjoy a secure retirement; it's that they aren't preparing to enjoy a secure retirement. Worse, many people seem to have little idea what such preparation requires. Powell offers four suggestions to better prepare for life after full-time work (with our comments in parentheses):

  1. Figure out how much you'll need in retirement savings (it can be daunting to look at the numbers, but ignorance here is definitely not bliss)
  2. Estimate your life expectancy (with significant uncertainty here, the prudent default move is to assume you'll live a relatively long life)
  3. Calculate the cost of health care in retirement (this will vary depending on your coverage and your health)
  4. Stop spending so much money (no doubt, but this is easier said than done, especially in the first years of retirement when you want to travel, tee it up, attend every play and symphony concert in town, &c.)

Naturally, we'd add a fifth category: Get your investments in order! All the planning in the world won't get you where you want to be without a disciplined, high quality, cost-effective investment program.

In future posts we'll have much more on the issues surrounding self-reliance in retirement, the most important topic in personal finance for the foreseeable future.

Source

Robert Powell, "Pollyanna perceptions: Sunny Americans refuse to confront dark side of retirement," Marketwatch, April 12, 2007

April 16, 2007

SEC to Scrutinize 12b-1 Fees? It's About Time

On Friday, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox announced that the agency will take a good hard look at the 12b-1 fees assessed by many mutual funds, including a surprisingly large number of "no-load" funds. (For a short definition of 12b-1 fees, see Wikipedia or Investopedia).

We think this is long, long overdue, as 12b-1 fees are among the most egregious elements of the mutual fund business. Here's Cox on Friday:

Collecting an annual fee from mutual fund investors that is supposed to be used for marketing is no more consumer-friendly than forcing cable TV subscribers to pay a special fee of $250 a year so that the cable company can advertise HBO and Showtime to woo potential new customers.

Yes, but it's even worse than that. If you subscribe to HBO and pay a special fee to help the cable company or satellite provider attract new HBO subscribers, the quality of your HBO will be unaffected by any new subscribers. You've paid unnecessarily, but at least the product you bought is unharmed when new viewers sign up.

In the mutual fund business, it's very different. As Yale's David Swensen has written in Unconventional Success, 12b-1 fees are truly perverse, because they ask current shareholders to underwrite the dilution of their own shares. As a fund gets larger, it becomes harder and harder for it to outperform, and it becomes more and more an exceptionally expensive (and thus underperforming) index fund.

The original idea behind 12b-1 fees was that the increased assets facilitated by 12b-1 marketing expenditures would enable fund companies to reduce management expenses, and thus benefit shareholders. If only it worked that way! Some funds do reduce expenses as they get larger, and of course many do not. But for big funds the problem of asset bloat absolutely dwarfs any changes of a few basis points one way or the other in management expenses.

The case against 12b-1 fees is unassailably strong, but we expect to see some serious pushback from the mutual fund and brokerage industries. Should be an interesting process!

Source

Robert Schroeder, "'High time' for fund-fee review, says SEC's Cox," Marketwatch, April 13, 2007